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STUDENT COMMENTS
PACKAGE LICENSING AND POST-EXPIRATION
ROYALTIES: THE RISK OF MISUSE
In order to survive, the system of free enterprise has required constant
limitations of private concentrations of economic power. To foster the sys-
tem of free competition the antitrust laws generally prohibit monopolistic
forms of enterprise. The Constitution, however, declares, "The Congress
shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . ."' In furtherance of the
design stated in the Constitution, the patent and copyright laws have au-
thorized monopoly or restraint of trade in limited instances. A patent confers
upon the patentee the exclusive right to prevent others from making, using
or selling the invention covered by the patent for a term of 17 years. 2 This
right to the invention becomes public when the 17-year period expires. Thus,
the patent laws constitute an exception to the broad public policy of free
competition. The patent is a privilege "conditioned by a public purpose""—
the encouragement of invention. The patent system, furthermore, has a
built-in ambivalence in that the policy of rewarding the inventor by grant
of an exclusive right is both limited and inhibited by a fundamental policy
opposing any restriction on free competition. Accordingly, in most of its
decisions since 1937 the Supreme Court has been influenced more by its
fear of extending the patent monopoly than by a desire to reward the
inventor.4
The "public policy which includes inventions within the granted monop-
oly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention." 5 As a result
of attempts by patent holders to secure monopolies broader than those law-
fully granted by the Patent Office, the doctrine of patent misuse developed.
The misuse doctrine denies relief to patent holders who attempt to extend
the patent beyond the scope of the lawful grant. For example, a patentee
bringing an infringement action may fail to gain any judicial relief because
"courts, and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their
aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public in-
terest."6 Cessation of the misuse restores the right to injunctive relief and
1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
2 Patent Code of 1952, § 154, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
a Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
4 See Williams, Conflicting Landmark Decisions on Restrictive Patent Licenses;
Package Patent Licensing and Acquisitions, 10 Antitrust Bull. 295, 307, (1965).
5 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
6 Id. at 492. The equitable defense of "unclean hands" is normally applied to situa-
tions where the plaintiff has acted unjustly in the transaction of which he complains. The
misuse doctrine is broader in that it may be applicable regardless of whether the particular
defendant has suffered from the patent misuse. If the plaintiff's conduct has harried the
public interest (and even if it does not amount to a violation of the antitrust laws), this
is sufficient basis to establish the affirmative defense of misuse. See 314 U.S. 488 at 492-94
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damages for infringement occurring after the plaintiff has purged himself of
the misuse.?
Agreements involving package licensing or post-expiration royalties,
two types of patent business practice to be discussed in this comment, often
give rise to the use of a patent misuse defense. It is the purpose of this
comment to define the misuse doctrine in the interrelated areas of package
licensing and post-expiration royalties by attempting to clarify the existing
case law. Once the case law is understood, those practices which will create
the risk of misuse become apparent.
I. PACKAGE LICENSING OF PATENTS
The patentee may grant to others the right to make, use and sell under
his patent.8
 Such grants are effected through licensing agreements which
exact royalties for the rights transferred. Licensors often choose to include
more than one patent in agreements. This practice, known as package licens-
ing, characteristically involves the licensing of a group of patents for a
specific period of time in consideration for payment of a uniform or non-
diminishing royalty independent of the number of patents actually used or
remaining unexpired. Package licensing agreements are desirable in that they
often avoid "troublesome questions of infringement, complex bookkeeping,
the difficulty of determining which patents cover the present and future needs
of the licensee, cost differences, and similar practical considerations." 9
This practice obviously lends itself to the potential misuse of forcing
a licensee to accept unwanted patents in order to get a desired patent or
patents. Conditioning the sale or lease of one commodity on the sale or
lease of another, a practice known as a tying agreement or a tie-in, is con-
sidered a trade restraining device.'° Tying clauses in patent licenses gener-
ally compel the licensee to purchase unpatented or patented articles not
within the scope of the licensed patent.
Since 1917 it has been established by the courts that tying the sale of
a second product to a patented product is illegal." The theory is that the
tying is harmful because it creates a new monopoly wholly outside that
granted by the patent. The tie-in, in addition, involves a direct restraint of
trade in that it limits the choice of the licensee in his use and purchase of
(1942). See also United States Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465
(1957); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933).
7
 For a comprehensive discussion of the misuse doctrine see Nicoson, Misuse of the
Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 76 (1962).
8 Sec Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
9 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
(March 31, 1955) (hereinafter cited as Committee Report) at 239.
10
 See Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) prohibiting such agreements where
the effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce."
11 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) ; see
also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton Salt Co.
v. G.S: Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) ; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27 (1931); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale
L.J. 19 (1957).
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the other products and gives the patentee an unfair advantage over his
competitors. In the 1948 case of United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 12
the Supreme Court extended its general disapproval of tying arrangements
to the "block-booking" of copyrighted films, i.e., the requirement that along
with the desired films the buyer purchase other films. By analogy to the
patent area, the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws (hereinafter referred to as the Committee Report)
relied on this copyright case to condemn mandatory (or coerced) package
licensing of patents,'" which is the practice of refusing to license less than
a complete package. Though the Supreme Court has not yet addressed itself
to the legality of this practice the law as to mandatory package licensing,
a species of tying arrangement, seems relatively clear. A refusal to license
less than a complete package transforms package licensing into a misuse,
because the licensor is then tying his patents to each other. Where, however,
the licensee voluntarily accepts a package, no misuse occurs.
The leading Supreme Court decision on package licensing is Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 14 Since the Hazeltine case, vol-
untary package licensing "has stood on a relatively sound legal footing... 2' 15
Hazeltine Research, a corporation which is not a manufacturer but which
derives its income from licensing patents, entered into a ten year licensing
agreement with Automatic Radio. Under the agreement the licensee was to
pay royalties for the use of 570 patents, 200 applications, and any future
patents acquired by Hazeltine. The royalties were based on a percentage
of sales by Automatic Radio of complete radio broadcasting receivers. The
licensee did not have to use any of Hazeltine's patents in the manufacture
of its products but it was required to pay the royalty whether it used them
or not. When Automatic Radio refused to pay the royalties, Hazeltine sued
for the amount due. As an affirmative defense Automatic Radio claimed
that the agreement involved a patent misuse. The Court held that it is not
per se a misuse of patents to require the licensee to pay royalties based on
a percentage of its sales even though none of the patents is used:
We cannot say that payment of royalties according to an agreed
percentage of the licensee's sales is unreasonable. Sound business
judgment could indicate that such payment represents the most
convenient method of fixing the business value of the privileges
granted by the licensing agreement. 16
According to the Court, the royalty provision created no restraint of
12 334 U.S. 131 (1948). In 1962 the Supreme Court held that the block booking of
copyrighted feature motion pictures for television exhibition is prohibited under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. The Court stated that the economic power required to make the practice a
restraint of trade is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted. United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
13 Committee Report at 239-40.
14 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
15 AllSeil, "Flat-Rate" Package Licenses and the Post-Expiration Royalty—Worlds
in Collision, 26 Fed. 13.J. 206 (1966).
16 339 U.S. at 834; see Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Butterfield, 366 F.2(1 (9th Cir.
1966).
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competition beyond the legitimate grant of the patent and, therefore, was
not unreasonable. In rejecting Automatic Radio's attempt to apply tie-in
cases, the Court noted that there was no requirement for the purchase of
goods in the agreement and that Hazeltine did not manufacture or sell
goods. ] ? Instead the Court viewed the licensing agreement as essentially
a grant by the licensor of a privilege to use any of its patents in considera-
tion for payment of royalties unrelated to actual use. It is important to
note that some but not all of the patents had expired, a point which the
opinion did not discuss but which became significant in later cases. Further-
more, as counsel for the licensee in Hazeltine failed to press the argument
of misuse by mandatory package licensing, 18
 the Court assumed that the
package was voluntarily taken.
The Committee Report, in approving of Hazeltine, attempted to estab-
lish some guidelines by which to determine when package licensing is mis-
used:
Package licensing should be prohibited only where there is refusal,
after a request, to license less than a complete package. Addition-
ally, the licensor should not be required to justify on any propor-
tional basis the royalty rate for less than the complete package, so
long as the rate set is not so disproportionate as to amount to a
refusal to license less than the complete package. For example,
where a substantial group of patents are offered at a flat royalty
rate, the deletion of one or several specified patents need not affect
the rate. . . . Moreover, where several "per piece" licenses are
requested and offered, the mere fact that the sum of the "per
piece" license royalties exceeds the package royalty rate should not
of itself be considered a condition that all or no patents be taken,
again, so long as the "per piece" rate is not so disproportionate as
to amount to a refusal to license less than the complete package."
The position taken in the Committee Report is in accord with that taken in
American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 2° the most authoritative
statement concerning the question of mandatory package licensing. In that
case the Third Circuit, affirming a decision by the District Court for the
District of Delaware,21
 held that the policy of the patentee to refuse to grant
17
 339 U.S. at 831. In an amicus curiae brief the Government had argued that a tie
was present.
18
 Id. In a strong and rather convincing dissenting opinion Justice Douglas, who was
joined by Justice Black, stated, "The inevitable result [of the licensing agreement] is that
the patentee received royalties on unpatented products as part of the price for the use of
the patents.
"The patent owner has therefore used the patents to bludgeon his way into a partner-
ship with this licensee, collecting royalties on unpatented as well as patented articles.
"A plainer extension of a patent by unlawful means would be hard to imagine." Id.
at 838.
19 Committee Report at 39-40.
20 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959). The facts of the case
were similar to those in Hazeltine, except that American Securit involved an issue of
coercion.
21
 154 F. Supp. 890 (D. Del. 1957).
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a license under one or more of its patents unless a license was taken under
all for a fixed royalty constituted unlawful coercion and an unlawful use of
the patent monopoly. Because of such misuse, plaintiff was barred from
enforcing its patents in an infringement action:
Mandatory package licensing is no more than the exercise of the
power created by a particular patent monopoly to condition the
licensing of that patent upon the acceptance of another patent, but
that is too much.
Whatever may be the asserted reason or justification of the patent
owner, if he compels a licensee to accept a package of patents or
none at all, he employs one patent as a lever to compel the accept-
ance of a a license under another. Equity will not countenance
such a result.22
Thus, according to the Third Circuit, mandatory package licensing is per se
a patent misuse under the same principle applied in the "tie-in" cases.
Insofar as they approve of package licensing except where it is manda-
tory, the Committee Report and American Securit establish a sound rule.
The general objections to forbidden tying arrangements being directly appli-
cable to mandatory package licensing, that practice is clearly a misuse. Un-
fortunately, neither the Committee Report nor American Securit definitively
states the degree of coercion that must be present in order to make a package
license compulsory. In trying to establish a suitable rule, a decision by the
Seventh Circuit has somewhat confused the area.
Apex Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Altorfer Bros. Co. 23 held, inter alia, that
where there was no refusal to license less than all of three patents in the
package, 24 it was no misuse for the patent owner to insist that exactly the
same royalty be paid whether under one, two, or three of the patents. Apex
thus states that it is not illegal coercion for a patentee to offer to license
individual patents or less than the full package for the same royalty as
would be charged for the full package. An argument in favor of such a
position can be made, based on the well-established doctrine of patent law
that a licensee is estopped from challenging the validity of the patent. 25 By
accepting the package, the licensee would be estopped from contesting the
validity of every patent in the entire package, including those not desired
by him. On the other hand, by paying the same royalty for a single patent,
the licensee is at least free to contest the validity of those patents he re-
fused to accept. In other words, although the licensee pays the same royalty
for a single patent he receives more than if he had accepted the full package
at the same price. Arguably he then has a genuine alternative when he is
22 268 F.2d at 777.
23 238 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1956).
24 Id. at 871. "Plaintiffs at first charged a minimum royalty of fifty cents which was
later increased to sixty cents and for this royalty they were always willing to grant a
license under one, two or three patents." Id. at 872.
25 United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905) ; see the dissenting opinion
of Justice Frankfurter in MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402,
408 (1947).
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offered a choice between one patent and a package at the same rate. This
being so, theoretically there is no coercion. 26
It is highly improbable that the Supreme Court would take the position
enunciated in Apex. It seems clear that refusal to reduce a fiat royalty rate as
fewer patents are licensed amounts to coercing the licensee into acceptance
of the full package. Such a practice entails a "per piece" rate "so dispro-
portionate as to amount to a refusal to license less than the complete pack-
age,"27
 and thus offends the standard established by the Committee Report.
The freedom from being estopped as to those patents not accepted by the
licensee would appear to be of such speculative value that it would not, in a
real sense, offer the licensee a genuine choice. Indeed, it would be a rare
licensee who would be willing to license one patent when he could license a
package of patents for the same price.
II. POST-EXPIRATION ROYALTIES
The problem of post-expiration royalties, though it may arise inde-
pendently, often arises within the context of package licensing so that the
two areas are often inextricably linked. Following the expiration of the
statutory 1 7-year monopoly granted to the patentee, 28 the patent becomes
public property. Thus, a license agreement providing for royalty payments
which extend beyond the expiration date of the patent may constitute a
patent misuse. This is clearly the case when only one patent, rather than a
package of patents, is involved, as in Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen,
Inc.29
In that case a patent owner brought suit against a sub-licensee for
royalties due after lapse of the patent. The licensing contract stated that the
royalty would continue regardless of the expiration of the patent. The Third
Circuit declared that this practice of charging post-expiration royalties con-
stituted a misuse. The court relied to a degree on the Supreme Court case of
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.,"° which expressed a basic policy of
patent law. That policy is that the patent laws do not contemplate that
anyone by contract or by any form of private arrangement may withhold
26 See 11 Vill. L. Rev. 382,390 (1966).
27 See text at note 19 supra. See also International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336
F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965), wherein mandatory package
licensing of 2 patents was permitted. It was known that no one could produce a product
under one of the patents without infringing the other. Such patents are called "blocking"
patents as distinguished from competing patents. Since tying arrangements require 2 or
more distinct products and blocking patents are not distinct from each other, the anti-
competitive effects inherent in mandatory package licensing are not found when the patents
are blocking.
28 See note 2 supra.
29 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962).
30 326 U.S. 249 (1945). In Scott Paper an inventor assigned the patent to his em-
ployer. When he left the employment to start his own business, he allegedly infringed the
patent. In a suit brought by his employer he defended on the ground that the patent which
he had assigned had been copied from an expired patent. The employer, on the other hand,
claimed that the defendant was estopped from asserting the invalidity of the patent be-
cause he had assigned it for value. The Court held that the assignor was not estopped
from denying its validity where the device involved is that of an expired patent.
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from the public the use of an invention for which the public has paid by the
grant of a monopoly in the patented invention for a limited time. 31
In dictum of American Securit the Third Circuit had gone far beyond
its position in the later Ar-Tik case. In American Securit,,which condemned
mandatory package licensing, the court stated that the requirement that the
agreement shall continue in full force and effect to the expiration of the last
to expire of any of the patents "constitutes a patent misuse for it extends
the payment of royalties of patents under patents which may expire to the
expiration date of that patent most recently granted to Securit." 32 This
statement, which was unnecessary to the holding, put the Third Circuit on
record as being completely opposed to the practice of licensing a package of
patents at a flat or non-diminishing rate which is paid until the last patent
in the package expires.
In 1964 the Supreme Court decided what is now the leading case in the
area of post-expiration royalties, Brulotte v. Thys Co.'" The Thys Company,
which owned patents for hop-picking machinery, sold its machines to farmers
for a flat sum and issued a license charging an annual royalty for use.
The agreement in question licensed the defendants to use 12 patents relating
to the machine, though only 7 were actually incorporated in the machine.
All 7 of these patents had expired by 1957, and thereafter 2 licensees refused
to pay royalties which had accrued under the licensing agreement both before
and after the expiration date of the patents. Thys Company sued for royalties
due, and the defendants claimed that the plaintiff had misused its patents by
charging royalties after the patents had expired. The Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed the judgment of the lower court and held that the period
during which royalties were required was a reasonable amount of time over
which to spread payments for use of the patent."'
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the contract did not involve
payments for use during the pre-expiration period that were deferred until
later but, rather, that the royalty payments were by their termss'' for use
during the post-expiration period. Recalling the broad condemnatory lan-
guage of Justice Stone in Scott Paper,' the Court concluded that a patentee's
use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the
patent is unlawful per se. 37
 The decision also stated that the arrangement
31 Id. at 256-57.
82 268 F.2d at 777.
33
 379 U.S. 29 (1964); see 1965 Duke L.J. 836; The Supreme Court, 1964 Term,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 199 (1965) ; see generally 3 A.L.R. 3d 770 (1965).
34
 Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 62 Wash. 2d 284, 291, 382 P.2d 271, 275 (1963).
35
 The Court did not clearly state what type of terms will make an agreement one
involving post-expiration royalties. See note 37 infra.
"[A]ny attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those claiming
under him of the patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device
employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws." 326 U.S. at 256,
quoted in Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 31.
37 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan raised the objec-
tion, among others, that courts will not be able to distinguish legal deferred purchase price
payments from unlawful exaction of royalties after the patent expires. Skillful contract
draftsmen will merely draft the contract in the form of a deferred purchase price pay-
ments contract; form, not substance, will govern, and the decision of the majority,
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was analogous to forbidden tying arrangements 3s The Court expressly dis-
tinguished Hazeltine on the basis that all of the patents in that case had not
expired, while in Brulotte all 7 of the patents incorporated in the machine
had expired prior to the termination date for the payment of royalties." By
choosing to distinguish Hazeltine, the Court, in effect, refused to go as far as
did the Third Circuit dictum in American Securit which totally opposed the
practice of licensing a package of patents with a flat royalty rate paid until
expiration of the last patent in the package. Since the dictum in American
Securit is contrary to the legality of the arrangement in Hazeltine, insofar as
some of the patents in the Hazeltine package had expired, 4 ° the Supreme
Court in Brulotte did not prohibit package licensing in which a non-dimin-
ishing rate is exacted until all the patents expire. Although Brulotte did in-
volve more than one patent, the fact that 7 patents incorporated into the
machine had all expired renders the holding of the case only a slight extension
of the doctrine enunciated by the Third Circuit in Ar-Tik.41
In refusing to go as far as the Third Circuit did in its American Securit,
dictum, the Court in Brulotte left unanswered several rather important
questions:
(1) In a package licensing situation, are flat-rate royalties forbidden
only where all of the licensed patents have expired?
(2) If not, under what circumstances will a non-diminishing royalty
rate on a package license constitute a misuse? For example, will the courts
permit a minor patent that is the last to expire to extend a uniform royalty
rate from the inception of the license to the expiration of the last patent?
In attempting to answer these questions, the cases since Brulotte have created
Justice Harlan believes, will become ineffectual. It would appear that since the Court is
not clear as to what terms will render a licensing agreement a misuse, draftsmen will
probably try to avoid any question of post-expiration royalties misuse , by requiring that
all payments be made before expiration of the last patent in the package. Thus, Justice
Harlan's criticism may be only a theoretical point. Justice Harlan also distinguishes re-
striction of use of the machine from restrictions on use of the patented idea, which is
illegal once the idea has fallen into the public domain. Id. at 34-39.
38
 "A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with
the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those royalty payments
beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the
patent by tiring the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented
ones." Id. at 33,
For a criticism of the analogy between tying and projecting royalties into unpatent-
able years, see 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, supra note 33, at 200 n.6. See also 65 Colum. L. Rev.
1256 (1965). This article also suggests that the per se rule of Brulotte is too harsh. The
writer suggests that the patent holder should be given a chance to show that no unfair
use of patent leverage was involved by adoption of a rule establishing' only a presumption
that post-expiration payments are actually for post-expiration use. Id. at 1270-71.
39 "Automatic Radio Co. v, Hazeltine . . . is not in point. While some of the patents
under that license apparently had expired, the royalties claimed were not for a period
when all of them had expired." 379 U.S. at 33.
40
 The Hazeltine decision, 339 U.S. 827 (1950), did not concern itself with the post-
expiration royalty question, although the facts indicated that not all of the patents had
expired. See 379 U.S. at 33, n.5.
41
 The Court expressly agreed with Ar-Tik, 379 U.S. at 33-34. The fact that only 4
of the 5 other patents, which were not incorporated in the machine, had expired, apparently
was not considered significant by the Court. See Id. at 30, n.2.
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some confusion. It is therefore necessary to analyze them in light of the
Brulotte precedent in order to see if they can be reconciled with that case.
M. CASES SINCE Brulotte
The first significant case which attempted to deal with some of the
problems left unsolved by Brulotte was McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Sur-
veys, Inc.42 The case involved a package licensing agreement similar to the
one found in Hazeltine. Well Surveys, Inc. (WSI), the licensor, charged its
licensee a flat rate of the receipts from using WSI's method of logging oil
wells, regardless of whether any or all of the patents in the package were
used. The licensee, McCullough, as one of its defenses to an infringement
suit by WSI, claimed that WSI had misused its patents because some of
those in the package had expired.
The Tenth Circuit held that the package licensing agreement was not
made unlawful by the fact that the royalties were payable at a flat rate
based upon the licensee's overall operations, even though some of the patents
in the package had expired or would expire during the period of the agree-
ment. The court distinguished Brulotte by noting that there was no attempt
by WSI to extend the period for paying royalties beyond the date of expira-
tion of the last of the patents covered by the agreement. 43 In upholding the
post-expiration aspects of the agreement, the court relied chiefly on the
factual similarity to Hazeltine:
The validity of such an agreement was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
339 U.S. 827 .... The facts in that case are almost identical with
the facts in this case ....
The package licenses were offered for a flat percentage of the
licensee's operations, whether or not any of the patents were used.
There, as here, some but not all of the patents had expired before
the license agreement in question was executed and more of them
would expire during the effective period of the agreement. 44
Insofar as the decision held that there was no misuse in licensing a group of
patents at a flat rate which continued unchanged after expiration of some
of the patents, it is clearly justified under existing case law. The case falls
squarely within the protection of Hazeltine wherein only some of the patents
had expired, as was noted by the Supreme Court in Brulotte. Certiorari was
denied in McCullough."
42 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 933 (1966).
43 The license agreement in Brulotte "attempted to extend the period for paying
royalties beyond the date of expiration of the last of the patents covered by the agreement.
That is not the case here or in Hazeltine." Id. at 410.
44 Id. at 409.
45 383 U.S. 933 (1966).
McCullough also held that the patentee did not engage in mandatory package licensing
and therefore did not violate the prohibition established by American Securit. No misuse
was shown in patentee's package licensing agreements since the evidence established that
WSI had been willing to grant licenses on its patents individually or collectively upon
reasonable terms. The Tenth Circuit thus reaffirmed the reasoning of the Third Circuit in
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McCullough thus did not actually answer question (1) above. It did
not go so far as to indicate that in a package licensing situation flat-rate
royalties are forbidden only where all of the licensed patents have expired.
On the contrary, the case merely holds that non-diminishing royalty rates
are not necessarily forbidden simply because some of the licensed patents in the
package have expired. Both questions (1) and (2), however, are explored in
Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc." Rocform corpora-
tion held patents relating to the process of pouring concrete. It licensed the
patents in a package as the "Rocform System," charging a flat price for use
of the patents up to termination of the last necessary patent. When Rocform
brought an infringement action, the licensee, as an equitable defense, claimed
the the licensor had misused its patents. The trial court dismissed the case
for want of equity,47
 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the basis that Rocform
misused its patents in failing to reduce the royalty after the most important
patent in the package had expired. The court considered the licensor's agree-
ment to be the equivalent of the practice of using a royalty agreement that
projects beyond the expiration date of the patent.
Rocform, of course, claimed that its licensing agreement was legal under
Brulotte, which only went so far as to disapprove of a package license which
continued to charge royalties after all the patents had expired. The Sixth
Circuit, however, distinguished Brulotte by noting that the Rocform agree-
ment was a "licensing arrangement where one important patent (about to
expire) is grouped with others of longer duration for 'leverage'," rather
than a "sale of a piece of machinery which incorporated a number of pat-
ents"48
 as in Brulotte.
The Rocform decision, in finding a post-expiration royalties agreement
to be illegal, adds a necessary corollary to the broad condemnation in Bru-
lotte of royalties charged after all of the patents expire. In other words it an-
swers question (1) above negatively by holding that in a package licensing
agreement, flat-rate royalties are not forbidden only where all of the licensed
patents have expired. It also answers question (2) in part by showing one
condition under which non-diminishing package royalties constitute a misuse
even though all patents in the package have not yet expired. A license agree-
ment, when it contains no diminution of the license fee at the expiration of a
patent of principal importance, constitutes an effort to continue to collect
royalties on an expired patent.
It is submitted that the answers found in Rocform are correct. Ad-
American Securit by indicating that an element of coercion, such as a refusal by the
licensor of a request to license less than all of the patents, is necessary to establish the
misuse defense of mandatory package licensing. 343 F.2d at 408. The court did find the
misuse of a tying arrangement in that WS' did not give the licensee the express right to
manufacture its own instruments and in effect compelled him to buy the necessary instru-
ments from WSI. Id. at 407. For a recent patent case involving a tying arrangement and
a concise discussion of the misuse doctrine, see Columbus Automotive Corp. v. Oldberg
Mfg. Co., 264 F. Supp. 779 (D. Colo. 1967).
46 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966).
47 237 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
48 367 F.2d at 681. Having found a misuse, the court refrained from granting relief
until plaintiff purged itself of the prohibited practice.
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mittedly the facts are in form distinguishable from those in Brulotte because
all of the patents in the Rocform package had not expired. However, when
all of the "important" patents in the package have expired the licensing
agreement is in substance the same as the one prohibited by Brulotte. Roc-
form merely extends Brulotte so as to prevent licensors from extending
royalty payments for a patent which is about to expire by grouping it with
others of little importance.
Hopefully it will be feasible for triers of fact to determine when a
patent is "important!' In making this determination the courts should limit
the prohibition in Rocform to cases where the "important" patents are
known to be important when licensed. The words used by the court to dis-
tinguish Brulotte suggest that the court intended such a limited holding. It
would seem unfair to allow a licensee who has taken a package of patents of
unknown value to refuse to pay the royalty originally agreed upon when one
patent turns out to be very valuable but is about to expire. This would be
to rob the licensor of the benefit of his original bargain.
As did McCullough, Rocform also dealt with the issue of mandatory
package licensing. The dissenting opinion by Judge O'Sullivan argued that
coercion is essential to a finding of misuse and that none was present in Roc-
form's agreement because, when requested to sign the patentee's contract,
the defendant refused without suggesting any other agreement which would
be acceptable and without requesting that it be given a license limited to one
patent. The majority appears to be totally correct in rejecting this argument
by observing that a demand for the desired patents as separate items is not
"essential to a defense of misuse when the patentholder seeks equitable
relief from infringement while still pursuing the illegal practice." 49 That is to
say, the practice of charging post-expiration royalties is in itself a misuse
establishing a defense separate from and independent of the misuse defense
of mandatory package licensing.'° The majority did find an element of coer-
cion in that the agreement contained neither a termination provision that
would have enabled the licensee to cancel upon expiration of the first patent
nor a provision for reduced royalties upon such expiration.". This finding,
however, indicated an effort to collect royalties on an expired patent rather
than illegal mandatory package licensing.
A recent decision by the Tenth Circuit in Well Surveys, Inc. v. Perfo-
Log, Inc.'s= appears to be in conflict with the Sixth Circuit's holding in Roc-
form. Perfo-Log involved a package license with one "important" patent,
the Swift patent, which expired in 1968, and the less important Peterson
patent which will not expire until 1978. When WSI brought an infringement
action, the defendant claimed misuse. The court at the trial level granted
summary judgment for the defendant, holding, among other things, that
49 Id at 681.
55 In Rocform, the plaintiff argued that, even if it had engaged in mandatory package
licensing, that practice is not a misuse where interlocking patents are involved. Id. at 679.
See discussion of International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965), note 27 supra.
61 367 F.2d at 680.
52 396 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3185 (Nov. 18, 1968).
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"[a] license agreement when it contains no diminution of license fee at the
expiration of the most important patent and contains no termination clause
at the will of the licensee constitutes in effect an effort to continue to collect
royalties on an expired patent."53 To support this conclusion of law the court
cited Rociorm.54 What gives the lower court decision an added significance
is the fact that the judge stated a conclusion of law much too broad to be sup-
ported by existing case law. That conclusion of law reads: "A package
license agreement which provides that that agreement shall continue in full
force and effect until the expiration date of the last patent to expire under
which the license is granted constitutes patent misuse because it extends the
payment of royalties under patents which will expire to the expiration date
of patents which will expire later." 55 This statement is nothing more than
the broad dictum of American Securit, 30 which case the district court cited
for support. As was stated before, this type of broad statement would render
illegal the agreement in Hazeltine, insofar as some of the patents in the
Hazeltine package agreement had expired. The statement also disregards
Brulotte, where the Supreme Court distinguished 'Hazeltine as a decision
in which some but not all of the patents had expired.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, taking a much less re-
strictive view of the practice of package licensing, reversed and remanded
the case for judgment on the merits on the broad ground that package
licensing is not a misuse in the absence of coercion." The court construed
the language of the royalty provision as requiring payment only for opera-
tions which infringed a patent right of WSI. Since the Swift patent had ex-
pired at the time of the decision, it could not be infringed; 58 therefore, the
court concluded that the agreement did not exact a royalty on an expired
patent. Accordingly, the court stated that no royalty was payable unless the
Peterson patent was used. The question, said the court, was whether the
licensee was forced to enter the package agreement." Since the defendant
offered no evidence on this point, while the plaintiff's affidavits claimed that
there was no coercion, the court assumed for the purpose of deciding defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment that there was no coercion.
Per fo-Log argued that Rocform governed the case. The court did not
agree:
In its statement of facts the Sixth Circuit said that Rocform offered
to license only under its standard package agreement. In the case at
bar, the affidavits submitted by WSI show a willingness to license
any or all patents under reasonable, negotiated terms. If the Roc-
53 1967 Trade Cas. ¶1 72,187, p. 82,272. The court also stated that the patentee at-
tempted to recapture part of the expired "important" patent. "Recapture" seems to imply
that the patentee knew the patent was important when he licensed it.
54 Id. The district court also found mandatory package licensing.
53 Id.
56 Sec text at note 32 supra.
57 396 F.2d at 17-18.
58 Id. at 17. The trial court could not come to such a conclusion since at the time
of its decision the Swift patent had not expired.
59 Id.
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form decision is taken as holding that a package license, including
both important and unimportant patents, is misuse per se when
there is no diminution in royalty, or provision for termination, after
the expiration of an important patent, we respectfully disagree and
adhere to our decision in the first McCullough case. The relative
importance of patents has no significane if a licensee is given the
choice to take a patent alone or in combination on reasonable
terms. Freedom of choice is the controlling question."
In his dissenting opinion in Rocform, Judge O'Sullivan stated, "I read the
majority opinion as holding that, without reference to coercion, the Rocform
contract was illegal per se because, as viewed by them, Rocform was at-
tempting to extend the life of one of its patents."" This seems to be a correct
interpretation of the holding in Rocjornz. If so, Rocformr  and Perjo-Log are
conflicting decisions.
The position taken by the Tenth Circuit in Per jo-Log closely resembles
that taken in the Rocform dissenting opinion by Judge O'Sullivan, who
argued that coercion is essential to a finding of misuse. As was stated before,
this argument is flawed; for, if coercion is present, the misuse is that of
mandatory package licensing and the court need not even consider the issue
of post-expiration royalties. Nevertheless, Per fo-Log does raise troublesome
questions. If a licensee voluntarily enters into a package licensing agreement,
one would expect that he would be bound to it even though the licensor
would continue to receive the same royalty after an important patent ex-
pired. The very fact that the licensee voluntarily agreed to such a contract
would appear indicative of his belief that the patents in the package, other
than the one about to expire, were of sufficient value or "importance" to
merit the royalty upon which the parties agreed.
If the Tenth Circuit is saying that licensing agreements that in sub-
stance charge post-expiration royalties by extending the life of an important
patent are lawful so long as they are freely negotiated, the court is disre-
garding the principles articulated in the Ar-Tik and Brulotte cases. The
Tenth Circuit's decision in Per o-Log, however, may be interpreted as hold-
ing that, until all patents in the package expire, a freely contracted package
license is not assailable on the basis that it exacts post-expiration royalties.
The reasoning is that the parties themselves have determined by voluntary
agreement that no patent is of singular importance. Such an interpretation is
suggested by the court's statement that "[t]he relative importance of patents
has no significance if a licensee is given the choice to take a patent alone or
in combination on reasonable terms." 62
 In other words, the court appears to
reject the whole Rocform concept of the "important" patent in a voluntary
package license.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Per jo-Log. 63 Hopefully the Court
ao Id. at 18. The court interpreted its decision in the McCullough case as requiring
coercion for a misuse. Id. at 1 7.
61 367 F.2d at 684.
62 396 F.2d at 18.
63
 37 U.S.L.W. 3185 (Nov. 18, 1968).
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will solve this problem in the future. The Court's limited decision in Brulotte
made necessary the additional rule found in Rocform. Future clarifying rules
will be needed to handle situations similar to Rocform where all the patents
have not expired, but in substance all "important" patents have expired or are
about to expire. The Supreme Court may conclude that it will not be feasible
for trial courts to decide, as w`as done by the district court in Perfo-Log,
when a patent is of singular importance. If so, the Court might adopt a
position which does not restrict the practice of package licensing. Such a
position would forbid the use of flat-rate royalty provisions in package licenses
only after all of the licensed patents have expired. Thus question (1) would
be answered in the affirmative and consequently question (2) would not be
reached.
CONCLUSION
Apart from the question of post-expiration royalties, the law as to
package licensing is relatively clear. Voluntary package licensing is permis-
sible under the Hazeltine decision. Although the Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue, it is safe to say that mandatory package licensing is a
misuse since it is merely a species of tying arrangement. The practice is
especially objectionable because it limits the freedom of the licensee to take
only those patents which he wants. Such use of a patent to extend the monop-
oly granted by the Patent Office should not and will not be tolerated by the
courts.
When package licensing is used, projecting royalties into years beyond
the expiration date of a patent is not so obviously objectionable as manda-
tory package licensing. Both practices may extend the benefits accrued by the
patentee to encompass an element not within his original grant, but post-
expiration royalties involve no direct restraint of trade in the sense of limit-
ing the freedom of the licensee or giving the licensor an unfair advantage
over potential competitors. Therefore, in the area of post-expiration package
royalties the courts will likely give favorable consideration to the policy of
rewarding the inventor and not look only to the countervailing policy of
restricting the legal monopoly granted by the patent. It is also possible,
however, that the latter policy will eventually dominate. Thus the Supreme
Court may decide to go further than it did in Brulotte by adopting the posi-
tion represented by the dictum in American Securit which was repeated by
the district court in Perfo-Log.°4 Such a decision would transform into a
misuse all package licensing agreements which maintain a flat royalty until
all patents in the package expire. Future licensing agreements would then
have to contain provisions for proportional diminution of license fees as
each patent in the package expired, or a clause providing for termination at
the will of the licensee as certain patents expired. Requiring these provisions
would appear to negate the practical business considerations for which pack-
age licensing is maintained." For instance, great problems would arise in the
situation where the licensee takes a package of patents which are all of
64 See text at note 55 supra.
65 See text at note 9 supra.
156
PACKAGE LICENSING
speculative value and agrees to pay a royalty based on a percentage of gross
sales. One of the patents may become very valuable but expire after a few
years while the remaining "unimportant" patents do not expire for several
more years. A proportional reduction of license fees should then logically
approach 100%, giving the licensee a windfall reduction while thoroughly
discouraging package licensing. Provisions for proportional diminution of a
a package royalty rate as each patent expired would also entangle courts in
the question of what constitutes a proportional reduction. This in turn would
lead courts into the troublesome issues concerning the relative "importance"
of patents. If, in the future, package licensing became impracticable because
the Supreme Court adopted the American Securit dictum, patent holders, of
course, could set up separate licensing agreements with individual royalty
rates for each patent. Such separate licensing agreements have been called
"commercially impracticable/"60 and would entail the loss to businessmen
of those advantages found in the practice of package licensing.
Pricing of a patent license presents quite a difficult task. Monetary
return from a patent is rarely related to cost since there is no satisfactory or
ascertainable correlation between research and development expenses and
invention.6' Industry norms, therefore, are generally the basis for estab-
lishing royalty rates." If those norms based on package licensing rates were
lost, disruptive difficulties in pricing might arise. The complex pricing,
accounting and other business problems involved in proportional reductions
of package licensing agreements, or in individual licensing, and the wide-
spread use by patent holders of package licensing for reasons of business
practicality suggest that package licensing should not be excessively curtailed
by the courts.
The courts have been struggling to strike a balance between the con-
flicting policies of rewarding the inventor and of restricting private concen-
trations of economic power. As yet, they show little inclination to accept the
broad dictum in American Securit. Accordingly, licensing agreements need
not contain provisions for proportional diminution of royalty rates as each
patent in the package expires. Contrary to the belief of some commentators,"
uu Herbster, Suggestion for a Package Licensing Program, 10 Idea 519, 532 (1966).
This commentator has suggested that this type of royalty scheme, in addition to being
"commercially impracticable," may be suspect under the decision of American Photocopy
Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966), wherein the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that exorbitant royalty rates involving the bulk of the industry can be so
high as to amount to a method of price-fixing. That high royalty rates will become un-
lawful seems unlikely since on remand the trial court held that the royalties charged
were reasonably within the reward which the patentee was entitled to secure. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed this decision, 384 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1967). Also, Justice Douglas, by way
of dictum, stated in Brulotte, "[A] patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high
as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly." 379 U.S. at 33.
67
 Adams, The Legality of Compulsory Package Licensing of Patents, 12 Antitrust
Bull. 773, 794-95 (1967).
68 Id.
69
 Anse11, supra note 15, at 221. Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: The Search
for a Unitary Theory, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 512, 550 (1967) ; The Misuse Doctrine and
Post-Expiration, Discriminatory and Exorbitant Patent Royalties, 43 Ind. L.J. 106,
111 (1967).
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Hazeltine, Brulotte, McCullough and Rocform are reconcilable rather than
conflicting decisions. Therefore, it is submitted that the licensor should feel
free to charge a flat royalty rate until the last patent in the package has
expired, so long as the method used is a good faith, convenient method of
operation involving no patent of singular importance. If, however, it is com-
mercially practicable to reduce proportionately the royalty rate as each patent
or group of patents expires, the licensor may be wise to do so."
ROBERT S. BLOOM
7 See McCarthy, A Patent Licensing Policy for Minimizing Antitrust and Misuse
Risks, 46 J.P.O.S. 547, 566 (1964). Since the Supreme Court in the future might require
package royalties to be reduced proportionately as patents expire (i.e., might adopt the
dictum in American Secant), one commentator has suggested the obvious alternative of
limiting the life of the license to the first patent to expire until someone else litigates the
question. Williams, 10 Antitrust Bull. 295, 311 (1965).
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